Ordeal by Fire Essay

When Contrasting and comparing the two books â€Å"Ordeal by Fire† and â€Å"George B. McClellan and Civil War History† even though they are basically on the same subjects Thomas Rowland’s book deals with one subject exclusively, George B. McClellan. James McPherson is more of a chronological history of the Civil War that discusses McClellan’s efforts during the war. There is some mention of mental problems and indications of other problems he had, but most focused on the leadership and events of the war. Some of the problems with McClellan both books do address are his slowness and his problem with exaggeration. To understand where both authors are coming from and to understand George B. McClellan I first wanted to discuss his career and his abilities in the Civil War and to find out why he became known historically, as Rowland’s puts it â€Å"deranged and paranoiac† (Rowland, 1998 p. ix). Knowing what the man went through will help to understand possibly why he is generally considered a failure as a general. Let’s begin with the first campaign of the Civil War even though it was a minor battle it was the first win for the Union and these troops were under the command of George B. McClellan. This battle under McClellan’s leadership successfully drove confederate troops out of the Kanawha Valley of western Virginia during May and June of 1861 (McPherson, 1982 p. 159). McClellan’s victory gave this region a firm grip for the Union side and kept it from becoming in control of the confederates and eventually became West Virginia. But the first major battle was a different story. The battle at Bull Run Creek was a disaster and this is where McClellan was able to come in for his gleaming moment and save the day. This was where McClellan replaced McDowell who had been the General during Bull Run Creek. McClellan then later became general in chief (Rowland, 1998 p. 86). McClellan spent the fall and winter drilling his troops and whipping them into shape. This became the first incident that showed clearly McClellan’s contempt for Lincoln and probably began the rumors that spread about McClellan, I believe. President Lincoln couldn’t understand why McClellan was taking so long and to go into the field he began to express how he thought the general was being slow ordered the army into action. McClellan’s slowness is discussed many times in both books, some citing it as cautious or meticulous. Then even more bad decisions made by McClellan happened. Union forces in the West had won some very important victories before McClellan could make a move to aid those troops. Successes around the edge of the confederacy did not help to relieve northern frustration at the inactivity or failure of the Union forces on the eastern front and this helped to reinforce the general attitude towards McClellan’s generalship. Lincoln, because of this, relieved McClellan of his supreme command and ordered him to take the offensive command at the head of the Army of the Potomac and forced McClellan to begin campaigning (McPherson, 1982 p. 211). The overland route to Richmond was difficult so instead he moved his forces by water to the peninsula southeast of the confederate capital. After landing at Fort Monroe, a Union post, McClellan began moving up the peninsula in early April 1862. For months he was stalled at Yorktown which he chose to besiege rather than attack, another sign of slowness and stagnation (Rowland, 1998 p. 107). After the fall of Yorktown he pushed ahead to a point twenty miles from Richmond and waited for troops he had expected Lincoln to send but that didn’t happen. Lincoln instead had decided the troops were needed to defend Washington instead. Many think that if McClellan had moved more boldly and decisively he probably could have captured Richmond with the forces he had. But a combination of faulty intelligence reports and his own natural caution had led him to make the wrong decision in what he wrongly believed to be outnumbered by superior numbers (McPherson, 1982 p. 234). By the end of May the Confederates discovered that McClellan’s army were divided on each side of the Chickahominy River and attacked. In this battle named Seven Pines McClellan was barely able to hold his ground until corps from the other side crossed and saved the day. During this battle was when General Lee took command of the confederate army. At the end of June Lee began an all out effort to expel McClellan from his position on the outskirts of Richmond. In a series of battles that lasted seven days McClellan warded off Lee’s final assaults at Malvera hill and decided to retreat down the peninsula to a more secure point. In doing so it convinced Lincoln that the peninsula campaign was a wasted battle (Rowland, 1998 p. 66-67). On July 11th Lincoln appointed General Henry W. Halleck who had been in command of the western theater, to be the new general in chief. Halleck was ordered by Lincoln to order McClellan to withdrawal his army from the peninsula and join forces under General Pope that was preparing to move on Richmond by the overland route. As usual McClellan was slow in responding and the confederates got to Pope before he did. Pope was badly beaten before McClellan did arrive. McClellan was ordered back to Washington where he was stripped of command. But Lincoln desperate reappointed him to head the army of the Potomac (McPherson, 1982 p. 255-2160). Meanwhile Lee and his excited troops went on to invade Maryland in hopes o f isolating Washington from the rest of the North. But McClellan caught up with him near Sharpsburg and the bloodiest one day battle of the war happened. At Antietam on September 17th almost five thousand solders were killed on both sides and another eighteen thousand were wounded. The battle ended in a draw and Lee was forced to withdraw south of the Potomac River to protect his low supplies. McClellan was again slow in persuit6 and Lincoln blamed him for letting the enemy escape (Rowland 1998, p. 176-177). Lincoln believing he needed a stronger general because McClellan was so slow appointed Ambrose B. Burnside commander of the Army of the Potomac. A huge mistake on Lincolns part because Rowland put it he was â€Å"Replacing someone slow with someone considered dense† (Rowland 1998 p. 223). Rowland argues the war could be divided into two parts and each had demands on the commanders that fought them. In Rowland’s book McClellan is overly cautious, proud, psychologically impaired and an aristocratic officer that was brought up against very formidable commanders Lee and Jackson. With the battle of Seven Pines and Antietam campaign he had to face is what Rowland says, gave McClellan every reason for caution. Other reasons Rowland gave were that McClellan commanded a new hastily thrown together army in the beginnings of the war when the nation was expectations were huge and fast victories was wanted. Because of McClellan’s slowness I believe that is was not possible. Both books relied heavily on historical documents, letters and diaries to defend their thesis but Rowland’s book does give a lot more weight to the writing by other professors that wrote controversial books on the subject. But then again the type of book Rowland wrote needs those types of sources to make the valid stand he was taking. McPherson’s book uses a huge amount of historical documents, letters and diaries. His reference and bibliography totally impressed me. Rowland introduces more feeling into his book than concentrating on facts. But in my experience when using personal letters and notes, I believe, there is too much room for interpretation unless you know the author. Many letter were used that were between McClellan and his wife and granted they are useful, but I think we still have to keep in mind that unless the author or recipient of these letters are alive, it would almost be impossible to know the intent and unconscious meaning in them. If I was to choose which book that I would rely more of facts it would have to be McPherson’s book. Like I mentioned before it wasn’t filled with emotional feelings as Rowland’s book and to me used more reliable sources. Dealing with the Civil War and the historical documents can be a huge job and McPherson did an excellent job of using the mounds and mounds of documentation available. One thing I think both authors do agree upon was that McClellan, even though he wasn’t the best, he wasn’t the worst of commanders. One thing I did think was different in the authors accounting of the general was that McPherson did discuss a problem McClellan had with chronic exaggeration (McPherson, 1982 p. 212). And this attribute was mentioned many times when he discussed McClellan and opposing forces. McClellan would say he was waiting for more troops to arrive citing the numbers of the opposing force as the reason. This caution was seen as slowness. I do side with Rowland when he wrote that he wanted to give a balanced look at McClellan and recognition for his achievements. He did a good job of giving reason and theory to McClellan’s actions. Rowland’s statement, â€Å"McClellan’s strategy, though reflective of the unrealistic war aims of the years 1861-1862 was cogent, reasoned, and consistent with conventional military wisdom and his personal views of the nature of the conflict. It was not hallucinatory or deranged; it mirrored the views of the administration and of a sizeable, if not shrinking, majority† (Rowland, 1998 p. 237). The only thing that didn’t make him great was his inability for great wins. References: McPherson, J. M. (1982). Ordeal by fire: The Civil War and reconstruction. New York: Knopf. Rowland, T. J. (1998). George B. McClellan and Civil War history: In the shadow of Grant and Sherman. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. Similar link: https://studymoose.com/road-safety-essay